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Part I of this paper seeks to investigate the possible bias, or difference in usage, in the use of the
word “constitutional” with particular reference to the now resolved tension between the Court of
Justice of the European Communities and the German Constitutional Court. Part II discusses some
landmark cases in which the European Courts had to decide whether the powers of the Commission
of the European Communities in competition investigations are limited by “constitutional” rules.
Part III discusses the Court’s use of the general principles of legal certainty, legitimate expectation,
and proportionality to resolve problems of interpretation and application in competition law.
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The title of this paper was proposed by the organizers of
the 1989 Fordham Corporate Law Institute Conference where
it was first delivered. But, as one of them confessed, "The use
of the word 'constitutional' may be attributable to an Anglo-
Saxon bias, or even a specifically American bias." Is there a
bias, or at least a difference in usage, that reflects significant
differences between Community law and American law?
Part I of this paper seeks to answer that question with par-
ticular reference to the now resolved tension between the
Court ofJustice of the European Communities (the "European
Court" or the "Court") and the German Constitutional Court.
Part II discusses some landmark cases in which the European
Court had to decide whether the powers of the Commission of
the European Communities (the "Commission") in competi-
tion investigations are limited by "constitutional" rules. These
cases are: National Panasonic v. Commission,' A M & S v. Commis-
sion,2 and the group of very recent cases decided in September
and October of 1989, Hoechst v. Commission 3 Dow Chemical ir-
ica v. Commission ("Dow"), 4 Orkem (previously CdF Chimie) v. Com-
t A version of this Article will be published in 1989 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. (B.
Hawk ed. 1990). Copyright © Transnational Publications, Inc., 1990.
* Judge of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities; formerly
Salvesen Professor of European Institutions at the University of Edinburgh, Scot-
land.
1. Case 136/79, 1980 E.C.R. 2033, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8682.
2. Case 155/79, 1982 E.C.R. 1575, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8757.
3. Joined Cases 46/87 & 227/88 (Judgment of Sept. 21, 1989), 1989 E.C.R. -.
For previous unsuccessful interlocutory proceedings, see Case 46/87R, [1988] 4
Common Mkt. L.R. 430.
4. Joined Cases 97-99/87 (Judgment of Oct. 17, 1989), 1989 E.C.R. -.
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mission,5 and Solvay v. Commission.6 Part III discusses the
Court's use of the general principles of legal certainty, legiti-
mate expectation, and proportionality to resolve problems of
interpretation and application in competition law. This paper
does not attempt to deal comprehensively with the numerous
competition cases in which questions of due process (or rights
of defense) have been raised.7
I. "CONSTITUTIONAL RULES" IN THE COMMUNITY'S
LEGAL ORDER
Some European lawyers, and certainly some European
politicians, would refuse to accept the word "constitutional" as
part of the vocabulary of Community law. They would insist,
perhaps rightly, on the importance of the distinction between
treaty law and constitutional law. Those who would be pre-
pared to describe the Community treaties (the "Treaties") 8 as
being in some sense the constitution of the Community would
probably use the expression "constitutional rules" to refer to
the parts of the Treaties that deal with the classical preoccupa-
tion of federal constitutions: the creation of the three Commu-
nities, the merger of their institutions, and the allocation and
separation of powers between those institutions and also be-
tween the Communities and the Member States.
Where the Community Treaties create individual rights,
they do so in the context of their economic objectives. Their
self-standing, entrenched provisions are essentially concerned
with economic prescription. As Jean Monnet is said to have
remarked, "the whole treaty is about competition." There is
nothing in the Treaties to compare with the catalogue of indi-
5. Case 374/87 (Judgment of Oct. 18, 1989), 1989 E.C.R. -.
6. Case 27/88 (Judgment of Oct. 18, 1989), 1989 E.C.R. _.
7. A full discussion and comprehensive bibliography can be found in A. PLIAKOS,
LES DROITS DE LA DtFENSE ET LE DROIT COMMUNAUTAIRE DE LA CONCURRENCE 441
(Bruylant 1987). For a discussion of the rights of defense in competition cases before
the Commission, see C.S. KERSE, E.E.C. ANTITRUST PROCEDURE 115-39 (2d ed.
1988). Recent cases in which such issues have been raised unsuccessfully include:
British Leyland v. Commission, Case 226/84, 1986 E.C.R. 3263, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,336 and BAT and Reynolds v. Commission, Cases 142 & 156/84, 1987
E.C.R. 4487, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 14,405.
8. The European Communities were founded upon three treaties: Treaty Estab-
lishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951; Treaty Establishing
the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]; Treaty
Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957.
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vidual rights set out in the U.S. Bill of Rights. For such a cata-
logue, a Commmunity lawyer would look to the European
Convention on Human Rights (the "European Convention" or
the "Convention") 9 and the national constitutions of the Mem-
ber States.
By contrast, although the commerce clause of the U.S.
Constitution has been described as the mechanism by which
the Supreme Court strives to maintain a working federalism,
an American lawyer would not expect to look in the Constitu-
tion for details of the way in which his legal system gives effect
to the commerce clause. The U.S. Constitution is less specific
in prescribing economic objectives than Article 3 of the Euro-
pean Economic Community (the "EEC") Treaty,' 0 let alone
Articles 85 and 86. In some respects this may not matter be-
cause to an outside observer of the American legal system, it
sometimes seems that the Sherman Act" has acquired a consti-
tutional, if not mystical, significance. Nevertheless, were there
to be a direct conflict between the Bill of Rights and the en-
forcement of antitrust law, the Bill of Rights would prevail.
The same result does not follow as easily in Community
law. Indeed, at one stage, the lack of a legally binding cata-
logue of fundamental rights gave rise to a potentially serious-
and truly "constitutional'"-conflict between the European
Court and the German Federal Constitutional Court. In re-
sponse to a reference from a German administrative court, the
European Court held that
the validity of a Community measure or its effect within a
Member State cannot be affected by allegations that it runs
counter to either fundamental rights as formulated by the
constitution of that State or the principles of a national con-
stitutional structure .... The protection of [fundamental]
rights, whilst inspired by the constitutional traditions com-
mon to the Member States, must be ensured within the
framework of the structure and objectives of the Commu-
nity. 12
9. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention].
10. EEC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 3.
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988).
12. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fir Ge-
treide und Futtermittel, Case 11/70, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, 1134, 3-4, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8126, at 7424-7425.
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The German administrative court then asked the Constitu-
tional Court whether the law, as declared by the European
Court, was compatible with the German Constitution. The
Constitutional Court held that, on the facts of the case, there
was no incompatibility. But the Court roundly declared that,
in the event of conflict between Community law and the guar-
antee of fundamental rights in the German Constitution, "the
guarantee of fundamental rights in the Constitution prevails so
long as [solange] the competent organs of the Community have
not removed the conflict of norms in accordance with the
Treaty mechanism." 3
This Solange decision' 4 generated much heated debate and
led, more or less directly, to a report on The Protection of Funda-
mental Rights in the Community presented by the Commission to
the European Parliament and to the Council of Ministers of the
European Communities (the "Council") in 1976,'" and there-
after to a Commission memorandum proposing Accession of the
Communities to the European Convention on Human Rights in 1979.16
For various reasons (including, it is said, a forcefully ex-
pressed adverse report by the British House of Lords' Select
Committee) 7 the Commission's proposal was taken no fur-
ther. Meanwhile, in its Vielleicht decision,"8 the German Consti-
tutional Court had softened its position, recognizing that
"[t]he legal order of the Member States and the legal order of
the Community do not stand side by side starkly and in isola-
tion; they are in many ways geared to one another, intertwined
with one another and exposed to reciprocal influences."'"
Although it was not mentioned at that stage by either the
European Court or the German Constitutional Court, a serious
underlying problem had been that, until 1974, France had not
13. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fuir Ge-
treide ("Solange I"), Case 2 BvL 52/71, 37 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE]
271, 281, [1974] 2 Common Mkt. L.R. 540, 551, 24.
14. Id.
15. BULL. EUR. COMM. Supp. No. 5 (1976).
16. BULL. EUR. COMM. Supp. No. 2 (1979).
17. Select Committee on the European Communities: Human Rights, H.L.
1979-80 Sess., 71st Rep., 44 22-43 (1980).
18. Fa. Steinike und Weinlig v. Bundesamt fir Ernahrung und Forstwirtschaft
("Vielleicht"), Case 2 BvR 6/77, 52 BVerfGE 187, 200, [1980] 2 Common Mkt. L.R.
531, 535, 4.
19. Id. at 200, [1980] 2 Common Mkt. L.R. at 535, 4 4.
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ratified the European Convention. Further, although France
then ratified the Convention and recognized the compulsory
jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights,2 France
did not become fully part of the Convention system until 1981,
when it recognized the right of individual petition to the Euro-
pean Commission of Human Rights. 2 ' It was therefore inevita-
ble during the 1960s and 1970s that the European Court
should be cautious in its approach to the Convention as a
source of law and, correspondingly, that the German Constitu-
tional Court should have looked for a separate Community cat-
alogue of enforceable rights. The European Court has never
referred to the existence of this problem, but the reality of the
earlier German concern about the French position was made
explicit in the Mittlerveile (or Solange II) judgment 22 of the Ger-
man Constitutional Court in 1986.
The issue in Solange II was essentially procedural, but the
underlying question was whether the German Constitutional
Court could be called upon to determine the c6nstitutionality
of Community legislation which had formed the basis of dis-
puted acts on the part of German public authorities. The Ger-
man Constitutional Court declared itself satisfied that
a measure of protection of fundamental rights has been es-
tablished . . . within the sovereign jurisdiction of the Euro-
pean Communities which in its conception, substance and
manner of implementation is essentially comparable with
the standards of fundamental rights provided for in the
Constitution. All the main institutions of the Community
have since acknowledged in a legally significant manner that
in the exercise of their powers and the pursuit of the objec-
tives of the Community they will be guided as a legal duty
by respect for fundamental rights, in particular as estab-
lished by the constitutions of member-States and by the European
Convention on Human Rights. There are no decisive factors to
lead one to conclude that the standard of fundamental
rights which has been achieved under Community law is not
adequately consolidated and is only of a transitory nature.
This standard of fundamental rights has in the meantime,
particularly through the decisions of the European Court,
20. European Convention, supra note 9, arts. 45, 48, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 246.
21. Id. art. 25(1), 213 U.N.T.S. at 236-38.
22. Re Wuinsche Handelsgesellschaft ("Solange II" or "Mittlerweile"), Case 2
BvR 197/83, 73 BVerfGE 339, [1987] 3 Common Mkt. L.R. 225.
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been formulated in content, consolidated and adequately
guaranteed.3
The judgment then went on to trace the development of
the case law of the European Court. This decision deserves to
be cited at length, not only as a useful summary of the case law
but also, and more importantly for present purposes, because
it identifies the legal rules which the Constitutional Court of
the most populous Member State classifies as "constitutional
rules."*
In the early years the European Court refused to inves-
tigate accusations by parties that decisions of the High Au-
thority had infringed principles of German constitutional
law and in particular Articles 2 and 12 of the Constitution;24
it stated that it had no authority to ensure respect for rules
of internal law in force in one or other Member State, even
if they involved principles of constitutional law, and ex-
plained that "Community law as it arises under the Euro-
pean Coal and Steel Community Treaty does not contain
any general principle, express or otherwise, guaranteeing
the maintenance of vested rights. ' ,2 5 In the following pe-
riod the European Court made it clear that the general prin-
ciples of Community law, the maintenance of which it was
bound to protect, included the fundamental rights of the
individual. 26 It is true that in the Internationale Handelsgesell-
schaft case 27 it held that the validity of a Community mea-
sure or its effect within a particular member-State could not
be affected by an allegation that it ran counter to fundamen-
tal rights as formulated by the constitution of the member
State or to the principles of its constitutional structure; [but
the Court] would still have to consider however whether an
analogous guarantee under Community law had been disre-
garded, for the safeguarding of fundamental rights formed
23. Id. at 378, [1987] 3 Common Mkt. L.R. at 259, 35-36 (emphasis in origi-
nal).
* Infra notes 24-27, 30, 32-38, 40-41 have been amended to conform to this
journal's citation style.
24. Stork v. High Authority, Case 1/58, 1959 E.C.R. 17, 26.
25. Geitling v. High Authority, Joined Cases 36-38 & 40/59, 1960 E.C.R. 423,
439.
26. See Stauder v. UIm, Case 29/69, 1969 E.C.R. 419, 425, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8077, at 8118.
27. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, Case 11/70, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8126.
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part of the general principles of law which the Court had to
protect.28 Whilst the protection of such rights must be sup-
ported by the constitutional traditions of the member-States
they must also operate within the structure and objectives
of the Community.29
The European Court took the essential step (from the
viewpoint of the [German] Constitution) in its judgment in
the Nold case 3" where it stated that in relation to the safe-
guarding of fundamental rights it had to start from the com-
mon constitutional traditions of the member-States: "it
cannot therefore allow measures which are incompatible
with fundamental rights recognised and guaranteed by the
constitutions of those States."' 1
On the legal basis of the general principles of Commu-
nity law thus defined and given that content, the European
Court in the period that followed cited fundamental rights
as recognised in the constitutions of member States as obli-
gatory standards for reviewing measures of Community or-
gans taken within their spheres ofjurisdiction. Side by side
with the express guarantees of liberties contained in the Community
Treaties themselves32 the foreground was occupied naturally
by the fundamental rights and freedoms relating to economic activi-
ties, such as the right to property and freedom to pursue economic
activities.33 In addition to that it cited other basic rights, such
as freedom of association, the general principle of equal treatment and
the prohibition on arbitrary acts, religious freedom or the protection of
the family, as standards of assessment. 34
28. Id. at 1134, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8126, at 7424-7425 (footnote ad-
ded).
29. Id. (footnote added).
30. Nold v. Commission, Case 4/73, 1974 E.C.R. 491.
31. Id. at 507 (footnote added).
32. See, e.g., EEC Treaty, supra note 8, arts. 7, 48 et seq., 59 et seq., 67 et seq. (em-
phasis added).
33. See SAVMA v. Commission, Case 264/81, 1984 E.C.R. 3915, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) $ 14,149; Agricola Commerciale Olio v. Commission, Case 232/81,
1984 E.C.R. 3881, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,148; Hauer v. Land Rheinland-
Pfalz, Case 44/79, 1979 E.C.R. 3727, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8629; Nold v.
Commission, Case 4/73, 1974 E.C.R. 491, 507 (emphasis added).
34. See Diatta v. Land Berlin, Case 267/83, 1985 E.C.R. 567, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 14,169; Michel v. Commission, Case 273/83, 1985 E.C.R. 354; Samara
v. Commission, Case 266/83, 1985 E.C.R. 196; Kupferberg v. Hauptzollamt Mainz
("Kupferberg II"), Case 253/83, 1985 E.C.R. 166, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,175; Finsider v. Commission, Case 250/83, 1985 E.C.R. 142; Biovilac v. EEC,
Case 59/83, 1984 E.C.R. 4057, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) t 14,150; Defrenne v.
Sabena, Case 149/77, 1978 E.C.R. 1365, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) $ 8500; Ruck-
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The European Court has generally recognised and con-
sistently applied in its decisions the principles, which follow
from the rule of law, of the prohibition of excessive action and of
proportionality as general legal principles in reaching a bal-
ance between the common-interest objectives of the Com-
munity legal system and safeguarding of the essential con-
tent of fundamental rights.3" It has recognised the prohibi-
lion of retrospection as an emanation of the basic principle of legal
certainty and has recognised the rule against double penalties
36
and likewise the obligation under the rule of law to state reasons for
individual decisions. 3 7 In Johnston v. The Chief Constable of the
Royal Ulster Constabulary 38 the [European] Court, having re-
course to the constitutional traditions of all the member-
States and to Article 13 of the European Human Rights
Convention, categorised the claim to effective judicial protec-
tion for the safeguarding of personal rights as a constituent part of
the guarantees for fundamental rights under Community
law.39 It regarded the duty to grant a legal hearing as an essen-
tial requirement of a fair procedural system." °
For the purposes of defining under Community law the
deschel v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St. Annen, Joined Cases 117/76 & 16/77, 1977
E.C.R. 1753, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8457; Prais v. Council, Case 130/75, 1976
E.C.R. 1589; Union Syndicale, Massa and Kortner v. Council, Case 175/73, 1974
E.C.R. 917 (emphasis added).
35. More recent examples are the judgments in: Procureur de la R~publique v.
ADBHU, Case 240/83, 1985 E.C.R. 531, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,164;
Fearon v. Irish Land Commission, Case 182/83, 1984 E.C.R. 3677, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 14,126; Heijn, Case 94/83, 1984 E.C.R. 3263, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,120; National Panasonic v. Commission, Case 136/79, 1980 E.C.R. 2033,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8682; Testa v. Bundesanstalt ffir Arbeit, Joined Cases
41, 121 & 796/79, 1980 E.C.R. 1979; Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, Case 44/79,
1979 E.C.R. 3727, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8629; Internationale Handelsgesell-
schaft, Case 11/70, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8126; cf M. Hilf,
in 1985 EUROPAISCHE GRUNDRECHT ZEITSCHRIFr [EuGRZ] 647, 649 (emphasis ad-
ded).
36. See Regina v. Kirk, Case 63/83, 1984 E.C.R. 2689, 2718, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,070, at 14,973; Racke v. Hauptzollamt Mainz, Case 98/78, 1979 E.C.R.
69, 86, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8541, at 7761; Boehringer v. Commission, Case
7/72, 1972 E.C.R. 1281, 1290, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8191, at 8575 (emphasis
added).
37. Netherlands and Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek v. Commission, Joined
Cases 296 & 318/82, 1985 E.C.R. 809, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,170; In-
termills v. Commission, Case 323/82, 1984 E.C.R. 3809, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,154; cf M. Hilf, in 1985 EuGRZ, at 650 (emphasis added).
38. Case 222/84, 1986 E.C.R. 1651; Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,304.
39. Id. at 1682, 17, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,304, at 16,887 (footnote
added) (emphasis added).
40. See National Panasonic, Case 136/79, 1980 E.C.R. 2033, 2058, Common Mkt.
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content and extent of fundamental rights the [European]
Court has also referred to the European Human Rights
Convention and its additional protocol ... .41
Compared with the standard of fundamental rights
under the [German] Constitution it may be that the guaran-
tees for the protection of such rights established thus far by
the decisions of the European Court, since they have natu-
rally been developed case by case, still contain gaps in so far
as specific legal principles recognised by the Constitution or
the nature, content or extent of a fundamental right have
not individually been the object of a judgment delivered by
the Court. What is decisive nevertheless is the attitude of
principle which the Court maintains at this stage towards
the Community's obligations in respect of fundamental
rights, to the ... rules and the legal connection of that law
(to that extent) with the constitutions of member-States and
with the European Human Rights Convention, as is also the
practical significance which has been achieved by the pro-
tection of fundamental rights in the meantime in the
Court's application of Community law.4 2
Any remaining doubt as to whether national constitutional
traditions and the European Convention can be treated as a
direct source of Community law seems to have been removed
by the Single European Act,4" also signed (but not fully rati-
fied) in 1986, the preamble of which refers to "the fundamen-
tal rights recognised in the constitutions and laws of the Mem-
ber States, in the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the European Social
Charter, notably freedom, equality and social justice.""
So, in October 1987, after the Single European Act came
into force, the European Court was able to refer unreservedly
to the European Convention as a source of law in terms that
differ slightly but significantly from those of a comparable dic-
Rep. (CCH) 8682, at 8067; Pecastaing v. Belgium, Case 98/79, 1980 E.C.R. 691,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8654 (emphasis added).
41. See Johnston, 1986 E.C.R at 1682, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,304, at
16,887; Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, Case 36/75, 1975 E.C.R. 1219, 1232, Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8322, at 7778.
42. Solange H, Case 2 BvR 197/83, 73 BVerfGE 339, 378-81, [1987] 3 Common
Mkt. L.R. 225, 259-62, 4 37-41, 44 (emphasis added).
43. O.J. L 169/1 (1987), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 21,000.
44. Id. preamble, at 2-3, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 21,000, at 9601.
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turn a year earlier.45
In its analysis of the European case law, the German Con-
stitutional Court identified several different types of rules that
had been adopted by the European Court "as obligatory stan-
dards for reviewing measures of Community organs taken
within their spheres of jurisdiction."46 Those rules were:
(i) the "express guarantees of liberties contained in the
Community Treaties themselves." 47
(ii) the "fundamental rights and freedoms relating to eco-
nomic activities" (e.g., the right to property; freedom to
pursue economic activity); 48
(iii) "other basic rights" (e.g., freedom of association; equal
treatment; protection against arbitrary treatment; reli-
gious freedom; protection of the family); 49
(iv) general legal principles which follow from the rule of
law:
(a) principles applied in such a way as to strike a bal-
ance between the general interest and individual
rights (e.g., prohibition of excessive action; propor-
tionality);5
(b) "principles deriving from the basic principle of
legal certainty" (e.g., prohibition of retrospection
or retroactive rule-making); 5
(c) "the rule against double penalties," (ne bis in idem);52
(d) "the obligation . . . to state reasons for individual
decisions;""
(e) the right "to effective judicial protection for per-
sonal rights;"54
(f) the right to a fair procedural system, including the
45. Compare UNECTEF (Union of Football Trainers) v. Heylens, Case 222/86,
1987 E.C.R. 4097, 4117, 14 (holding judicial remedy essential when national au-
thorities deny individual rights regarded as fundamental under EEC Treaty) with
Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, Case 222/84, 1986
E.C.R. 1651, 1682, 18, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,304, at 16,887 (recognizing
principles of Convention must be taken into consideration in interpreting Commu-
nity law).
46. Solange H, 73 BVerfGE at 379-80, [1987] 3 Common Mkt. L.R. at 260, 39.
47. Id. at 380, [1987] 3 Common Mkt. L.R. at 260, 39 (footnote omitted).
48. Id. (footnote omitted).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 380, [1987] 3 Common Mkt. L.R. at 260, 40.
51. Id. at 380-81, [1987] 3 Common Mkt. L.R. at 260-61, 40.
52. Id. at 381, [1987] 3 Common Mkt. L.R. at 260, 40 (footnote omitted).
53. Id. (footnote omitted).
54. Id.
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right to be heard.55
There are, of course, other ways in which the rules and
principles applied by the European Court could have been
classified. What is significant for present purposes is the way
in which the German Constitutional Court has brought to-
gether such a range of rules in a single comprehensive (but not
exhaustive) inventory, characterizing them as "obligatory stan-
dards" for the assessment of administrative action. 56 This in-
ventory includes, but goes well beyond, the conventional cata-
logue of individual rights to be found in national constitutions
and international conventions. It extends to embrace princi-
ples developed particularly in German administrative law and
adopted by the European Court as a legally and morally ac-
ceptable basis on which to resolve the conflict, inevitable in
any modern democratic society, between the general interest
and individual claims of right. These include the right to judi-
cial protection, the duty to state reasons, legal certainty, legiti-
mate expectation, and proportionality which have become cen-
tral concepts in the Community legal order.
So, at a simple level, there really cannot be much doubt
that there are "constitutional rules" in the Community legal
order. On the one hand, the European Court looks to national
constitutions as a source of applicable legal principles; on the
other, the German Constitutional Court has accepted that the
European Court's approach and case law are compatible with
the German Constitution. In that sense we are clearly dealing
with "constitutional" issues.
Nevertheless, it may appear to American lawyers that the
rules to which a Community lawyer would attach the most im-
portance are rather different from those which they would
themselves describe as "constitutional rules." There are per-
haps four reasons why this is so. First, Community law affects
only tangentially, if at all, those areas of law where questions of
fundamental human rights are most likely to arise-criminal
law, criminal procedure, law enforcement, family law, and the
law of property. Second, the legal systems of the Member
55. Id.
56. Id. at 379-80, [1987] 3 Common Mkt. L.R. at 260, 39.
57. For a discussion of the principles of legal certainty, legitimate expectation,
and proportionality, see infra notes 153-205 and accompanying text.
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States differ substantially in their procedures and, conse-
quently, in the way in which they give effect to fundamental
rights such as due process. Third, the "subjects" of Commu-
nity law are generally economic operators and are more likely
to be "legal persons" (e.g., corporations) than "natural per-
sons" (human beings). The approach of the Member States on
conferring "human" rights on legal persons is not* uniform,
nor even always consistent within the same state. Fourth, the
European Parliament is in no position to exercise the sort of
democratic control that the U.S. Congress regularly and force-
fully exerts over the executive branch. This places an addi-
tional responsibility on the European Court.
So, on the whole, the general principles or "constitutional
rules" of greatest day-to-day significance in Community law
are those which the Court uses to strike, and sometimes adjust,
the balance between the concern of the administrator to secure
the economic objectives of the Treaties and the concern of the
administri to know where he stands and to receive fair treat-
ment. It has to be remembered throughout, that the European
Court is not a supreme court of general jurisdiction but a crea-
ture of the Treaties whose law it exists to apply.58 While its
duty is to "ensure that . . . the law is observed,"59 it cannot
invent new remedies, its jurisdiction being limited to the forms
of action provided by the Treaties.6 0 The Court's room to ma-
noeuvre is provided by Article 173 of the EEC Treaty, which
empowers the Court to annul an administrative decision "on
grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential proce-
dural requirement, infringement of this Treaty or of any rule of law
relating to its application, or misuse of powers."'"
58. See EEC Treaty, supra note 8, arts. 164-88; Protocol on the Statute of the
Court ofJustice of the European Economic Community, Apr. 17, 1957. The Court's
powers include direct review of Community action pursuant to Article 173 of the
EEC Treaty and indirect control through cases referred to the European Court for
decision of a point of EC law by the national courts under Article 177 of the same
treaty. However, the Court's jurisdiction is not defined exclusively by the Treaties,
but also by provisions in other agreements, conventions, and protocols. See K.P.E.
LASOK, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 3 (1984).
59. EEC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 164.
60. See, e.g., id. arts. 169, 170, 173, 175, 177-82.
61. Id. art. 173 (emphasis added).
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II. COMPETITION INVESTIGATIONS AND THE POWERS
OF THE COMMISSION
The starting point for discussion of the landmark competi-
tion cases in which the Court examined "consititutional" rules
is the basic Competition Regulation (17/62) ("Regulation 17"
or the "Regulation").6 2 Regulation 17 confers on the Com-
mission expressly and in unqualified terms extensive powers to
request information,63 to conduct inquiries, 64 and to undertake
investigations.6 5 When the draft Regulation was before the
European Parliament, the Internal Market Committee, for
which Dr. Arved Deringer was Rapporteur, pointed out that in
defining the Commission's powers the Commission's proposal
failed to take account of "general principles applied in a state
based on the rule of law."' 66 But the Regulation was enacted
without amendment in this respect. The draft Regulation pro-
vided for the right to be heard in certain cases, and the text of
what became article 19 of the Regulation was improved in light
of the Deringer Report, but it does not provide for any right to
be heard before the Commission embarks on inquiries or inves-
67tigations.
Thus there is, on the one hand, a Community text that
confers wide powers of inquiry and investigation upon the
Commission in virtually unqualified terms and that confers the
right to be heard only in certain circumstances. On the other
hand, there is no text that expressly limits the scope or exer-
cise of the Commission's powers by reference to fundamental,
human, or "constitutional" rights. If a limit is to be placed on
the Commission's powers, the Court must find it in the "com-
mon law" of the Community.
62. Council Regulation No. 17, 5 J.O. 204/62, O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62, at
87, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2401 [hereinafter Regulation 17].
63. Id. art. 11, 5 J.O. at 208/62, O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62, at 90, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2501, at 1759-1760.
64. Id. art. 12, 5J.O. at 208/62, O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62, at 90, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2511, at 1762-1767.
65. Id. art. 14, 5J.O. at 209/62, Oj. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62, at 91, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2531, at 1767-1771.
66. 1961-1962 PARL. EUR. Doc. (No. 57) 30, 121 (1961).
67. Regulation 17, supra note 62, art. 19, 5J.O. at 210/62, Oj. Eng. Spec. Ed.
1959-62, at 92, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2582, at 1791-1794.
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A. The National Panasonic Case6 8
During 1979 the Commission, which suspected National
Panasonic of operating export bans, ordered an investigation
to be carried out at the company's premises in England. The
investigation was ordered by a formal decision of the Commis-
sion without prior notice to the company, and the Commis-
sion's inspectors appeared at the company's premises without
warning.6 9 They were asked to wait until the company solicitor
arrived but refused to do so. The inspectors then conducted
an investigation of the company's files and took away copies of
a number of documents, as they were empowered to do.7 °
National Panasonic challenged the Commission's decision
on a variety of grounds which, as Advocate General Warner
observed "appeared to merge into each other, the essence of
the applicant's complaint being that it had had no warning of
the investigation." 71
The failure to give prior warning was characterized by Na-
tional Panasonic as a breach of fundamental rights and of the
principle of proportionality. The fundamental rights claimed
were the right to privacy, 72 the right to be heard before an ad-
verse decision is taken,7 3 and the right to request a stay of such
a decision before it is executed. 4 National Panasonic claimed
that the principle of proportionality was violated because the
circumstances did not warrant an investigation without warn-
ing. 75
Neither the Advocate General nor the Court seems to
have had much difficulty in rejecting these contentions. The
oral hearing was on March 18, 1980, the Advocate General de-
livered his opinion on April 30, 1980, and the Court rendered
its judgment on June 26, 1980. In particular, the Court
pointed out that the rights guaranteed by article 8 of the Euro-
68. National Panasonic v. Commission, Case 136/79, 1980 E.C.R. 2033,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8682.
69. Id. at 2036, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8682, at 8054.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2065, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8682, at 8072 (Opinion of Advo-
cate General Warner).
72. Id. at 2056-57, 17, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8682, at 8067 (referring to
the European Convention, supra note 9, art. 8, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 230).
73. Id.
74. id.
75. Id. at 2059-60, 28, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8682, at 8069.
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pean Convention, "in so far as it applies to legal persons" (a
significant qualification), are subject to exception where inter-
ference with them "is in accordance with the law and is neces-
sary in a democratic society in the interests of . . .the eco-
nomic well-being of the country .... or for the protection of
the rights and freedom of others."76
Similarly, the Advocate General, referring to the compara-
tive studies undertaken in 1978, pointed out that the right to
be heard is subject to exceptions.77
The significance of the case for present purposes is that
Advocate General Warner drew attention to a feature of Regu-
lation 17 that was to be challenged in the Hoechst v. Commis-
sion 78 case seven years later:
What is somewhat unusual about Article 14, if it means what
to my mind it does, is that the Commission is empowered to
proceed without any sort of warrant from a judicial author-
ity. In general, though not always, the laws of Member
States require officers of a public authority to have such a
warrant before they may enter private premises. Indeed the
Deringer Report suggested, citing the German Constitu-
tion, that such a requirement should be written into what
are now Articles 11 and 14 of Regulation No. 17.
B. TheAM&S Case"°
The A M & S case, which started very soon after National
Panasonic, took considerably longer to argue and to decide.
Most unusually, there were two oral hearings and two opinions
of two different Advocates-General.8I
A M & S owned a zinc smelter in England. The Commis-
sion, exercising its powers under Regulation 17, instituted an
76. Id. at 2057, 19, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8682, at 8067.
77. Id. at 2068, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8682, at 8074 (citing Due Process in
the Administrative Procedure, 3 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 8TH CONGRESS OF LA FUD RATION
INTERNATIONALE POUR LE DROIT EUROPkEN 1.6-1.7 (1978) [hereinafter 3 FIDE]).
78. Joined Cases 46/87 & 227/88 (Judgment of Sept. 21, 1989), 1989 E.C.R. -.
79. Id. at 2068, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8682, at 8074.
80. A M & S v. Commission, Case 155/79, 1982 E.C.R. 1575, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8757.
81. Id. at 1619, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8757, at 9062 (Opinion of Advo-
cate General Warner, Jan. 20, 1981); id. at 1642, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8757,
at 9077 (Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, Jan. 26, 1982).
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inquiry into competitive conditions in the market for zinc.82 In
the course of the inquiry, inspectors were sent to the Bristol
premises of A M & S with a mandate authorizing them to "ver-
ify that there [was] no infringement of Articles 85 and 86 of the
EEC Treaty."'8 3 A M & S refused to produce for the inspectors
documents which its legal advisers said were covered by legal
professional (attorney-client) privilege. The Commission then
issued a decision requiring A M & S to produce "all documents
for which legal privilege is claimed."' 84 After sundry inconclu-
sive meetings with the Commission, A M & S took the issue to
the Court of Justice.
In a sense, the case, as presented to the Court, turned on a
question of procedure. Assuming the existence of legal privi-
lege in Community law, how was a claim of privilege to be veri-
fied? From a forensic point of view, the Commission was not
in a strong position to challenge the principle. Dr. Ehlermann,
then Director-General of the Commission's Legal Service, had
already expressed the personal view that "there exists a gen-
eral principle of law, applicable in Community law as part of
'the law' in the sense of Article 164 EEC Treaty . ..which,
within certain limits, assures the professional privilege, also in
administrative proceedings. '"85
The Commission accepted that it could not use privileged
documents in order to establish an infringement, 86 but claimed
that only the Commission could decide whether a document
was entitled to protection. Furthermore, in order to decide
that question, the Commission claimed that its inspectors must
be entitled to see the whole document. A M & S, supported by
the British government and the CCBE 8 7 contended that, if
82. Id. at 1579, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8757, at 9039.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Due Process in Administrative Procedure, Community Report by C.D. Ehlermann
and D. Oldekop, in 3 FIDE, supra note 77, at 11.6, quoted in A Ml & S, 1982 E.C.R. at
1623, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8757, at 9064 (Opinion of Advocate General
Warner).
86. Contrary to appearances, the Commission did not rely on a privileged docu-
ment in the Quinine decision. See Re Cartel in Quinine, EEC 69/240, 12J.O. L 192/5
(1969). The opinion ("legal consultation") relied on was already in the public do-
main in the United States. Id. at 19-20, 37-38. Similarly, no privilege could be
claimed for the opinion referred to in Miller v. Commission, Case 19/77, 1978 E.C.R.
131, 152, 18 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8439, at 7933.
87. La Commission Consultative des Barreaux de la C.E. (the liaison committee
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privilege existed, its purpose would be defeated were the Com-
mission able to inspect privileged documents. 8 Various ways
in which the claim of privilege could be decided without the
Commission seeing the documents were suggested. Only the
French government was prepared to contend that no claim of
privilege could be asserted in a competition investigation."9
After hearing Advocate General Warner, the Court de-
cided to inspect the documents itself.90 Following a procedure
that is used in Scotland (and perhaps elsewhere), the docu-
ments were sent to the Court in a sealed envelope. The Court
then drew up a record of the nature of the documents (without
revealing their contents or subject matter) such as "requests
for legal advice made by executives of the applicants and sent
to a solicitor in private practice in England" or "a letter con-
taining legal advice concerning the law of a third country sent
by a firm of solicitors in private practice in that country to a
person employed by the applicants' immediate parent in the
group" or "a memorandum summarizing legal advice given by
a solicitor in private practice in England sent by one executive
of the applicants to another."'" A second oral hearing fol-
lowed.
After the second oral hearing, Advocate General Slynn
concurred with Advocate General Warner in proposing that
the whole of the relevant part of the Commission's decision
should be declared void. 2 In what bears all the hallmarks of a
compromise decision, the Court took a more cautious ap-
proach.
The Court accepted that the confidentiality of communica-
tions between lawyer and client is a principle of law common
to the Member States and that Regulation 17 must be inter-
preted and applied in such a way as to give .effect to that princi-
ple.93 In dubio, the Court and not the Commission must decide
for the Bars and Law Societies of the European Community) was allowed to enter the
case as an intervener in support of the contentions of A M & S. See A M & S, 1982
E.C.R. at 1580, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8757, at 9040.
88. Id. at 1581, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8757, at 9041.
89. Id. at 1597, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8757, at 9051.
90. Id. at 1618-19, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8757, at 9055.
91. Id. at 1643-44, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8757, at 9078 (Opinion of Ad-
vocate General Slynn).
92. Id. at 1663, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) $ 8757, at 9090.
93. Id. at 1610-11, 1 18-22, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 8757, at 9059.
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whether the claim of privilege is justified. However, the Court
also noted that, while the general principle is common to the
Member States, its scope and the criteria for applying it vary.
So, application of the principle in Community law must be lim-
ited to "such elements ... as are common to the laws of the
Member States." '94
Effectively, this limited the protection to communications
made for the purposes and in the interests of the client's rights
of defense, and those emanating from independent lawyers
from Community Member States (thus excluding in-house law-
yers and lawyers from third countries).
The A M & S decision was disappointing in so far as the
Court limited itself to the elements common to the laws of all
the Member States, which is a more restrained approach than
that urged by early doctrinal commentators: that the aim of
Community law should be to find the best solution (in qualita-
tive terms), having regard to the spirit, orientation, and gen-
eral tendency of the national laws,95 the best solution being the
one in whose direction each legal system is unconsciously mov-
ing. 96
Nevertheless, the decision was a bold one. For the first
time the Court struck down a Commission decision that was,
on the face of it, fully justified by the express terms of Commu-
nity legislation, and it did so on the basis of a legal principle
which, although common to the Member States, did not ap-
pear in any national constitution or in the European Conven-
tion. In that sense it marks "the birth of a European common
law." 97
C. The Hoechst, Dow, Orkem, and Solvay Cases9 8
On January 15, 1987, the Commission launched its formal
inquiry into the thermoplastics industry (PVC and polyethyl-
94. Id. at 1611, 22, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8757, at 9059.
95. Reuter, Le Recours de la Cour deJustice des C.E. d des Principes Geniraux de Droit, in
MIANGES OFFERTS A HENRI ROLIN: PROBL MES DE DROIT DES GENS 273 (Pedone
1964).
96. Zweigert, Les Principes Genraux d Droit des Etats Membres, in NOVELLES: DROIT
DES COMMUNAUTiS EUROPkENNES 444-45, 1203-04 (Larcier 1969).
97. Id.
98. Orkem (previously CdF Chimie) v. Commission, Case 374/87 (Judgment of
Oct. 18, 1989), 1989 E.C.R. _; Solvay v. Commission, Case 27/88 (Judgment of Oct.
18, 1989), 1989 E.C.R. _; Dow Chemical Ib~rica v. Commission, Joined Cases 97-
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ene) by taking a decision authorizing on-the-spot investiga-
tions under article 14 of Regulation 17. 99 Armed with this de-
cision and accompanied by an official of the German Cartel Of-
fice (Bundeskartellamt), two Commission officials presented
themselves without warning at the premises of Hoechst.' 00
Hoechst refused them entry on the ground that they were at-
tempting, contrary to the German Constitution, to carry out a
search without judicial warrant.' 0 ' Two days later the Com-
mission officials tried again, accompanied by two federal offi-
cials and two police officers. Again, they were unsuccessful, as
they were on the following day too. The Commission then
sent Hoechst a telex requiring the company to submit to inves-
tigation under threat of a penalty of 1,000 ECUs a day if they
refused. Hoechst did refuse and the Commission took another
formal decision imposing that penalty.'0 2
The German Federal Cartel Office then applied to the
Frankfurt district court for a judicial warrant. This was refused
by the district court on the ground that no evidence of any
breach of the competition rules had been placed before it."13
Hoechst in turn raised an action in the European Court for
annulment of the Commission's formal decisions and unsuc-
cessfully sought to have them suspended.' 4 Eventually, on
March 31, 1987 the Cartel Office was successful in obtaining a
judicial warrant from the Frankfurt district court and Hoechst
submitted to the investigation two days later. The Commis-
sion then took a further decision definitively fixing the amount
of the penalty at 55,000 ECUs (55 days at 1,000 ECUs per
day). 10 5
The Hoechst case (or strictly speaking, cases) concerned the
legality of the Commission's three decisions requiring Hoechst
99/87 (Judgment of Oct. 17, 1989), 1989 E.C.R. _; Hoechst v. Commission, Joined
Cases 46/87 & 227/88 (Judgment of Sept. 21, 1989), 1989 E.C.R. _.
99. Hoechst, at 3-4, 1 (Judgment); see Regulation 17, supra note 62, art. 14, 5
J.O. at 209/62, O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62, at 91, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
2531, at 1767-1771.
100. Hoechst, at 4, 3 (Judgment); id. at 2 (Hearings).
101. Id. (Hearings).
102. Id. at 4, 3 (Judgment).
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to submit to investigation, imposing a daily penalty for refusal
to do so and definitively fixing the amount of the penalty.
Meanwhile, the Commission was more successful in Spain,
where its officials carried out investigations at the premises of
Dow Chemical Ib~rica, Alcudia, and Empresa Nacional del Pe-
tr6leo (ENP), being given access to offices, stores, and files and
to the attache case and personal diary of a representative of
Dow. 116 With less intervening excitement, these companies
also raised actions seeking annulment of the Commission's de-
cision requiring them to submit to an investigation. 0 7 In their
case, the contention was that the decision, or at least the man-
ner of its execution, was a breach of the fundamental right to
the inviolability of private premises and respect for private
life. 108
The Commission also proceeded against CdF Chimie
(which subsequently changed its name to Orkem) in France"°°
and against Solvay in Belgium." 0 Neither of these companies
challenged the decision launching the investigation. However,
the Commission subsequently sent each of them requests for
information under article 11 of Regulation 17. "' Both compa-
nies refused to answer certain questions and the Commission
then took formal decisions requiring them to do so."12 These
decisions were the subject of the Orkem and Solvay cases, where
the main issue, shortly stated, was whether Community law
recognizes the privilege against self-incrimination.
Hoechst, Dow, and the other two Spanish cases were treated
together by Advocate General Mischo who delivered his opin-
ion on February 21, 1989, l " while Orkem and Solvay were dealt
with by Advocate General Darmon on May 18, 1989.' " How-
106. Dow Chemical Ib~rica v. Commission, Joined Cases 97-99/87, at 4, 4
(Judgment of Oct. 18, 1989), 1989 E.C.R. -.
107. Id. at 3, 1.
108. Id. at 5, 7.
109. See Orkem (previously CdF Chimie) v. Commission, Case 374/87, at 3, 1
(Judgment of Oct. 18, 1989), 1989 E.C.R. _.
110. See Solvay v. Commission, Case 27/88, at 2-3, 1 (Judgment of Oct. 18,
1989), 1989 E.C.R. _.
111. Orkem, at 3, 1 (Judgment); Solvay, at 2-3, I (Judgment).
112. Orkem, at 3, 1 (Judgment); Solvay, at 3, 2 (Judgment).
113. Hoechst v. Commission, Joined Cases 46/87 & 227/88, and Dow v. Com-
mission,Joined Cases 97-99/87 ("Hoechst and Dow") (Consolidated Opinion of Ad-
vocate General Mischo, Feb. 21, 1989).
114. Orkem v. Commission, Case 374/87, and Solvay v. Commission, Case 27/
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ever, for the purposes ofjudgment, the cases were treated sep-
arately, judgment being given in Hoechst on September 21, in
Dow on October 17, and in Orkem and Solvay on October 18,
1989.
In many ways it is surprising that the points raised in these
cases were not raised before. As already mentioned, Advocate
General Warner had, seven years previously in National
Panasonic, expressed doubts about the Commission's powers of
search without judicial warrant.' 1 5 It says much for the
strength of the Commission's position that, until Hoechst did
so, no company had taken the crucial but risky step of refusing
admission to the Commission's inspectors. It is also notewor-
thy that none of the companies and (as far as the papers dis-
close) none of the lawyers involved were British, which an-
swers the oft-repeated canard that it is only British lawyers who
object to the beneficent practices of continental bureaucracy.
But perhaps it may be relevant that Germany, Spain, France,
and Belgium have written constitutions, while
out of the thirty-seven chapters of Magna Carta at least
twenty-three have become obsolete, or have been abolished
by later legislation, while among the fourteen which are not
definitely extinguished there are at least as many for the
benefit of the Crown as for the benefit of the subject, and
the remainder have only a precarious existence, if any. 1 16
1. The Hoechst and Dow Cases
Although the cases on article 14 of Regulation 17 should
logically be considered after those on article 11, Hoechst was
decided first, and its analysis set the pattern for the later cases.
In a long opinion, Advocate General Mischo began by consid-
ering the nature of the Commission's task and the purpose of
the powers conferred." 17 He pointed out that it is in the nature
of a competition investigation that the investigators do not
88, ("Orkem and Solvay") (Consolidated Opinion of Advocate General Darmon, May
18, 1989).
115. National Panasonic v. Commission, Case 136/79, 1980 E.C.R. 2033, 2068,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8682, at 8074 (Opinion of Advocate General Warner).
116. Rex v. Haddock (Lugg, J.), reported in A.P. HERBERT, UNCOMMON LAW 53,
54 (1969 ed.).
117. Hoechst and Dow, at 5-22, 11-49 (Opinion of Advocate General Mischo,
Feb. 21, 1989).
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know precisely what they are looking for, and still less, where
they are likely to find it, since "evidence of illegal agreements
... may be found infeuiles volantes often in manuscript, such as
notes taken at secret meetings held away from business prem-
ises, sometimes in a hotel in a non-Member State, with abbre-
viations and coded references."' 8 So, it cannot be right that
the Commission should be required to specify in advance what
it is looking for. It also follows that it must have the wide pow-
ers of investigation that the terms of Regulation 17 provide. 1 9
However, it does not follow that the Commission's inspec-
tors have active powers of search. After a lengthy comparative
study of the constitutional laws of the Member States, the Ad-
vocate General accepted the existence in Community law of a
fundamental right to the inviolability of commercial premises,
though not of the same intensity as in the case of a private
home.'2 0 He then considered the terms both of national legis-
lation and of article 8(2) of the European Convention and con-
cluded that the powers conferred on the Commission did not
per se violate any fundamental right even if backed by threats of
financial penalties.1 2 ' But do the powers conferred extend, as
the Commission claimed, to an active right of search, even in
the teeth of objection by the undertaking under investiga-
tion? 122
Here the Advocate General found an elegant solution
based on the terms of Regulation 17. Undertakings have a
positive legal obligation to submit to investigation, to open
files or filing cabinets when asked to do so, and to produce for
inspection any documents that the Commission's investigators
may ask to see. But if an undertaking refuses, then the Com-
mission may have to rely on the national authorities to force it
to do so.' 23 Thus the Commission neither has, nor can claim,
the type of powers for which a judicial warrant would be re-
quired under national law. If such powers are needed, they
118. Id. at 10, 22 (trans. by author).
119. See Regulation 17, supra note 62, art. 14, 5J.O. at 209/62, OJ. Eng. Spec.
Ed. 1959-62, at 91, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2531, at 1767-1771.
120. Hoechst and Dow, at 39-40, 103, 106 (Opinion).
121. Id. at 44, 116.
122. Hoechst v. Commission, Joined Cases 46/87 & 227/88, at 16-17, T 37
(Judgment of Sept. 21, 1989); Hoechst and Dow, at 14, 31 (Opinion).
123. Hoechst and Dow, at 16-20, 4 38-43 (Opinion).
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must be obtained by the appropriate national procedures,
without, however, allowing the undertaking time to dispose of
incriminating documents. 24
On the facts of Hoechst and Dow (where it was alleged that
the inspectors had opened files without permission), the Advo-
cate General concluded that there had been no breach of any
fundamental right.' 25 He distinguished between the decision
ordering the investigation, which in his analysis, ordered noth-
ing illegal, and the illegality of anything done by the inspectors
which would invalidate the result of the investigation to the ex-
tent that documents illegally obtained were relied on to prove
an infringement. There was, he held, no reliable evidence of
illegal actions on the part of the inspectors. i26
The Court followed the Advocate General on all points. It
remains to be seen whether the institutions will respond to his
suggestion obiter that the European Court ofJustice rather than
the national courts should be empowered to issue judicial war-
rants, if required, for Commission searches. 21
2. The Orkem and Solvay Cases
Orkem and Solvay were concerned with the Commission's
power under article 11 of Regulation 17 to require undertak-
ings to provide information. Faced with a long list of ques-
tions which the Commission required them to answer, the
companies invoked the privilege against self-incrimination re-
lying on the laws of the Member States,' 28 the European Con-
vention,129 and (a novelty) the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (the "International Covenant" or the
"Covenant"). 130
124. Id. at 21, $ 45.
125. Id. at 52, 140.
126. Id. at 48-52, 77 129-40.
127. Id. at 52-58, 141-54 (Opinion). There is a hint in the Hoechst and Dow
judgments that the Court may consider itself to have this power already. See Hoechst,
at 10, $ 19 (Judgment); Dow Chemical Ib~rica v. Commission, Joined Cases 97-99/
87, at 9, 16 (Judgment of Oct. 17, 1989), 1989 E.C.R. -.
128. Orken and Solvay, at 59-60, 7 97-98 (Opinion).
129. Id. at 59, 78, 77 96, 130; see European Convention, supra note 9, art. 6, 213
U.N.T.S. 221, 228.
130. Orkem and Solvay, at 59, 96; see International Covenant on Political and
Civil Rights, openedfor sigfiature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter Interna-
tional Covenant].
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The questions were set out under six headings including:
(1) meetings of producers; 13  (2) target prices or minimum
prices;' 32 and (3) quotas, targets, or market sharing between
producers of PVC.133
Advocate General Darmon had no difficulty in accepting
that there is, in the laws of the Member States, a common prin-
ciple establishing the right not to be required to testify against
oneself. 3 14 But he found that "this principle becomes less and
less common as one gets away from ... classical criminal pro-
cedure." 13 5
He then went on to analyze the national laws relating to
the privilege of commercial undertakings. He concluded that
131. Orkem, at 14-15, 37 (Judgment); Solvay, at 13, 34 (Judgment). The rele-
vant questions were:
(1) Please list the date and place of all meetings of PVC producers since 1st
January 1976 (even if you dispute the nature, subject matter or purpose
of these meetings); or
(2) Please indicate the meeting(s) at which your company participated, as
well as the name and position in your company of your representative.
Orkem, at 2-3 (Hearings) (trans. by author). For a discussion of the significance of
these questions, see text accompanying infra notes 144-52.
132. Orkem, at 15, 38 (Judgment); Solvay, at 13, 35 (Judgment). The relevant
questions on target and minimum prices were:
Please give, for the period between lstJanuary 1976 and the present, details
of each "initiative" on prices in the Western European market, which may
have been discussed, proposed, contemplated or approved by those taking
part in the meetings, in particular
(a) the date of its entry into force
(b) in table form, the target or minimum price for each quality, expressed in
each national currency;
(c) any concerted step or action which may have been considered or decided on to under-
pin these initiatives on prices;
(d) any action which may have been taken to hold up or modify the initiative
in question.
Orkem, at 4 (Hearings) (trans. by author) (emphasis added). For a discussion of the
significance of these questions, see text accompanying infra notes 144-52.
133. Orkem, at 15-16, 39 (judgment); Solvay, at 13-14, 36 (Judgment). The
relevant questions concerning quotas, targets, and market sharing were:
(1) Please state, for each year between 1976 (inclusive) and the present, the details of
any system or method enabling sales targets or quotas to be assigned to those taking
part and indicate any change or modification introduced from time to time.
(2) Please describe any method of checking each year compliance with any system of
volume targets or quotas and indicate how any departure from such targets or quo-
tas could be corrected.
Orkem, at 5 (Hearings) (trans. by author) (emphasis added). For a discussion of the
significance of these questions, see text accompanying infra notes 144-52.
134. Orkem and Solvay, at 60-68, $ 98-111 (Opinion).
135. Id. at 60, 98 (trans. by author).
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there would again be no problem in finding a common princi-
ple in the classical field of criminal law, but the position was
considerably less clear in the field of competition investiga-
tions: three or perhaps four Member States recognize no priv-
ilege for commercial undertakings; the position of two is
purely conjectural; others distinguish between the phase of in-
vestigation and the phase of "prosecution"; only two, Ger-
many and Spain, offer general protection, while the United
Kingdom recognizes the right of Parliament to derogate from
such privilege as there is.' 36
Against the background of "this mosaic of national solu-
tions," the Advocate General discussed the approach of the
Court with particular reference to A M & S 'M7 and concluded
that he could not derive from the laws of the Member States a
general principle of Community law recognizing a privilege in
favor of commercial undertakings at the stage of investigation,
whatever might be the situation after delivery of a statement of
objections and the start of formal proceedings. 38 He then
looked at the International Covenant and the European Con-
vention. The International Covenant explicitly recognizes the
right "not to be forced to give evidence against oneself or to
confess one's guilt.' 39 The Advocate General observed that
the Court had not previously looked at the Covenant and-
significantly-wondered whether it might be important that
Greece has not yet ratified it. 140 However, he concluded that
the Covenant is in any event irrelevant since it is only con-
cerned with the rights of human beings.' 4'
The European Convention contains no express protection
against self-incrimination but the European Court of Human
Rights has given an extensive interpretation to article 6, the
guarantee of a fair trial. 142 The Advocate General found no
compelling case law of the European Court of Human Rights
or the Commission of Human Rights but added, again signifi-
136. Id. at 60-69, 97-117.
137. Case 155/79, 1982 E.C.R. 1575, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8757; see text
accompanying supra notes 80-97.
138. Orkem and Solvay, at 75, 123 (Opinion).
139. International Covenant, supra note 130, art. 14(3)(g), 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
177.
140. Orkem and Solvay, at 76, 127 (Opinion).
141. Id.
142. See Oztiirk v. Germany, 73 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3, 17-21 (ser. A) (1984).
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cantly, that the European Court should not in any event feel
itself bound by the decisions of the European Court of Human
Rights. In the result, the Advocate General found that there
had been no breach of any fundamental right. 143
The European Court approached the problem rather dif-
ferently. It began by holding that Regulation 17 gives no right
to silence, but rather, requires active cooperation on the part
of the undertakings concerned, even if this involves providing
evidence of breach of the competition rules. 14 National law
provides no basis for a general privilege against self-incrimina-
tion in favor of legal persons in the field of economic law. 14
5
The European Court held that article 6 of the European Con-
vention "may be invoked by an undertaking subject to investi-
gation under competition law, [but] .. .neither its terms nor
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights establish
that [Article 6] recognises the right not to give evidence
against oneself." 146 Moreover, the Court found that the Inter-
national Covenant protects only those who are charged with a
criminal offense in the context of judicial proceedings.' 47
While these conclusions are stated with almost telegraphic
brevity, it may be significant that national law, the European
Convention, the decisions of the European Court of Human
Rights, and the International Covenant are treated as parallel
sources of applicable Community law. But too much should
not be read into this because no positive conclusion was drawn
from any one of them.
The surprise in the Orkem and Solvay judgments comes af-
ter the conclusion that there is no general principle of a right
to silence or privilege against self-incrimination.148 Having
reached that conclusion the Court goes on to state that
"[n]evertheless we must see whether some limits on the Com-
mission's powers of investigation during the preliminary in-
quiry do not flow from the need to secure respect for the rights
of defence which the Court has considered to be a fundamen-
143. Orkem and Solvay, at 90, 148-49 (Opinion).
144. Orkem, at 11-12, 27 (Judgment); Solvay, at 10, 24 (Judgment).
145. Orkem, at 12, 29 (Judgment); Solvay, at 10-11, 26 (Judgment).
146. Orkem, at 12-13, 30 (Judgment); Solvay, at 11, 27 (Judgment).
147. Orkem, at 13, 31 (Judgment); Solvay, at 11, 28 (Judgment).
148. Orkem, at 12-13, 30 (Judgment); Solvay, at 11, 27 (Judgment).
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tal principle of the Community legal order."' 49
Referring back to its Hoechst judgment, the Court recog-
nized that the rights of defense must not be prejudiced by any-
thing done in the preliminary stages of a competition inquiry.
So the Court distinguished between the right of the Commis-
sion "to oblige an undertaking to provide all necessary infor-
mation as to facts known to it and, where necessary, to produce
any relevant documents in its possession, even if these may
help to establish anti-competitive behaviour on the part of that
or another undertaking"' 150 and, on the other, a right "to
oblige an undertaking to provide answers which would require
it to admit the existence of an infraction which it is up to the
Commission to prove."'' 5 '
Put very shortly, the Court held that the Commission can
ask for facts and documents but cannot require companies to
answer leading questions. On this basis, the Court held that
certain of the questions put to Orkem and Solvay were objec-
tionable and, consequently, that the Commission's decision re-
quiring Orkem and Solvay to answer them was annulled.15 2
It is too early to assess the full significance of the decisions
in Hoechst, Dow, Orkem, and Solvay. But looking as a whole at
the cases discussed above it seems reasonable to infer that the
Court is more impressed by arguments that allow a balance to
be struck between the effective enforcement of competition
law and elementary fairness of procedure than by appeals to
unassailable and all-embracing "constitutional" rights. The
three cases in which the Court struck down Commission deci-
sions all turned upon a detailed and discriminating distinction
being drawn among specific documents (A M & S) or ques-
tions (Orkem and Solvay). The general principle of "rights of
defense" on which the Court relied seems, therefore, to be-
long to the family of flexible but universal principles discussed
below.
149. Orkem, at 13 32 (Judgment); Solvay, at 11, 29 (Judgment) (citing Miche-
lin v. Commission, Case 322/81, 1983 E.C.R. 3461, 3498, 7, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,031, at 14,512). This is now the Court's standard reference on "rights of
defense" as a general principle of Community law.
150. Orkem, at 14, 34 (Judgment); Solvay, at 12, 31 (Judgment).
151. Orkem, at 14, 35 (Judgment); Solvay, at 12, 9 31 (Judgment).
152. Orkem, at 16, 42 (Judgment); Solvay, at 14, 38 (Judgment). The objec-
tionable questions are printed in italics at supra notes 131-33.
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III. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION AND
APPLICATION
A. Legal Certainty
The principle of legal certainty means that the application
of the law to a given situation must be predictable. It was in-
voked by the applicants in the Quinine 153 and Dyestuffs 154 cases
on the ground that the Commission had delayed excessively in
imposing fines for violations of Article 85.55 The Court held
that it could not create what would amount to a statute of limi-
tations: indeed, the principle of legal certainty required that
limitation periods must be fixed in advance by the Community
legislature. 156 But the Court indicated that undue delay might
bar (estop) the Commission from imposing a fine. 157 Limita-
tion periods were fixed shortly thereafter. 15 8
The principle of legal certainty has been invoked more ex-
tensively by the European Court to cope with a series of
problems relating to the interpretation and interaction of the
principal EEC Treaty provisions, Articles 85 to 89. Article
85(2) provides in unqualified terms that "[a]ny agreements or
decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automati-
cally void."' 159 Article 85(3) goes on to provide that the provi-
sions of Article 85(1) "may be declared inapplicable,"' 160 but it
does not fully explain how the possibility of such a declaration
153. ACF Chemiefarma v. Commission, Case 41/69, 1970 E.C.R. 661, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8083.
154. Dyestuffs is actually comprised of three cases: (1) ICI v. Commission, Case
48/69, 1972 E.C.R. 619, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8161; (2) Geigy v. Commis-
sion, Case 52/69, 1972 E.C.R. 787, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8164; (3) Sandoz v.
Commission, Case 53/69, 1972 E.C.R. 845, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8165.
155. ACF Chemiefarma, 1970 E.C.R. at 721 (Opinion of Advocate General Gand);
ICI, 1972 E.C.R. at 702, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8161, at 8062; see EEC Treaty,
supra note 8, art. 85.
156. Sandoz, 1972 E.C.R. at 849, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8165, at 8173
(referencing Geigy, 1972 E.C.R. at 826, 21); Geigy, 1972 E.C.R. at 826, 21, Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8164, at 8138; ICI, 1972 E.C.R. at 653, 47, 49, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8161, at 8026.
157. Sandoz, 1972 E.C.R. at 849, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8165, at 8173
(referencing Geigy, 1972 E.C.R. at 826, 21); Geigy, 1972 E.C.R. at 826, 21, Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8164, at 8138; ICI, 1972 E.C.R. at 653, 47, 49, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8161, at 8026.
158. Council Regulation No. 2988/74, Oj. L 319/1 (1974).
159. EEC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 85(1).
160. Id. art. 85(3).
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fits with automatic nullity. If an agreement falls within the
terms of Article 85(1), is it void until declared valid, or valid
until declared void?
The question arose first in relation to "old agreements,"
that is, agreements already in existence when Regulation 17
came into force, making notification of an agreement to the
Commission an essential precondition for exemption under
Article 85(3). The Court interpreted Article 85 and Regula-
tion 17 in such a way as to ensure that such agreements would
have "provisional validity" until they were expressly declared
both to come within Article 85(1) and to be ineligible for ex-
emption under Article 85(3).161
The Court similarly applied the principle of legal certainty
to cope with the situation where an agreement had been noti-
fied to the Commission and exemption under Article 85(3) had
been applied for, but not yet granted. 6 Again, the Court held
that such agreements must have provisional validity.
On the face of it, the Court's reasoning applied equally to
"old" and "new" agreements. But it subsequently became ap-
161. De Geus v. Bosch, Case 13/61, 1962 E.C.R. 45, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
1 8003. In De Geus, the Court held that
[t]he opposite interpretation would lead to the inadmissible result that some
agreements would already have been automatically void for several years
without having been so declared by any authority, and even though they
might untimately be validated subsequently with retroactive effect. In gen-
eral it would be contrary to the general principle of legal certainty - a rule of
law to be upheld in the application of the Treaty - to render agreements
automatically void before it is even possible to tell which are the agreements
to which Article 85 as a whole applies.
Id. at 52, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 8003, at 7138.
162. Portelange v. Marchant, Case 10/69, 1969 E.C.R. 309, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8075. In Portelange, the Court held that
in the absence of an explicit finding that the individual agreement in ques-
tion not only contains all the factors mentioned in Article 85(1), but does
not qualify for the exemption provided by Article 85(3) . . . [elvery agree-
ment duly notified must be considered valid.... [I]t would be contrary to
the general principle of legal certainty to conclude that, because agreements
notified are not finally valid so long as the Commission has made no deci-
sion on them under Article 85(3) of the Treaty, they are not completely
efficacious. Although the fact that such agreements are fully valid may pos-
sibly give rise to practical disadvantages, the difficulties which might arise
from uncertainty in legal relationships based on the agreements notified
would be still more harmful.
Id. at 316, 11 13-16, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8075, at 8095; see Bilger v. Jehle,
Case 43/69, 1970 E.C.R. 127, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 8076; Rochas v. Bitsch,
Case 1/70, 1970 E.C.R. 515, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8102.
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parent that this would have the paradoxical result of turning
Article 85 upside down, since it would confer provisional valid-
ity on all notified agreements, even if manifestly illegal, and
would exclude the jurisdiction of the national courts to declare
them void under Article 85(2). Victims of illegal agreements
must have an effective remedy. But parties to bona fide agree-
ments must also know where they stand, and the delays in
processing applications for exemption were already considera-
ble. The Court reconciled these conflicting considerations in
this way:
In the case of old agreements, the general principle of con-
tractual certainty requires, particularly when the agreement
has been notified in accordance with the provisions of Reg-
ulation No. 17, that the [national] court may only declare it
to be automatically void after the Commission has taken a
decision by virtue of that Regulation. In the case of new
agreements, as the Regulation assumes that so long as the
Commission has not taken a decision the agreement can
only be implemented at the parties' own risk, it follows that
notifications in accordance with Article 4(1) of Regulation
No. 17 do not have suspensive effect. Whilst the principle
of legal certainty requires that, in applying the prohibitions
of Article 85, the sometimes considerable delays by the
Commission in exercising its powers should be taken into
account, this cannot, however, absolve the [national] court
from the obligation of deciding on the claims of interested
parties who invoke the automatic nullity. In such a case it
devolves on the [national] court to judge, subject to the
possible application of Article 177, whether there is cause to
suspend proceedings in order to allow the parties to obtain
the Commission's standpoint, unless it establishes either
that the agreement does not have any perceptible effect on
competition or trade between Member States or that there
is no doubt that the agreement is incompatible with Article
85. Whilst these considerations refer particularly to agree-
ments which must be notified in accordance with Article 4
of the Regulation, they apply equally to agreements ex-
empted from notification, such exemption merely constitut-
ing an inconclusive indication that the agreements referred
to are generally less harmful to the smooth functioning of
the Com[m]on Market.' 63
163. Brasserie de Haecht v. Wilkin-Janssen ("Haecht 11"), Case 48/72, 1973
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The increasing delays on the part of the Commission in
issuing decisions on applications for exemption led to the
practice of issuing "comfort letters"' 164 a classic example of
legal uncertainty. In the Perfume cases1 65 the Court answered a
series of questions from national courts on the legal effect of
such letters in which the Commission used this formula or a
variant of it: "there is no longer any need, on the basis of the
facts known to it, for the Commission to take action under the
Article 85(1) and the file may therefore be closed."' 166 The Eu-
ropean Court had to. deal with two questions. First, what effect
did a comfort letter have on the provisional validity of "old"
agreements? 67  Second, did such a letter amount to an ex-
emption under Article 85(3) and, if not, what was its effect vis-
A-vis automatic nullity under Article 85(2)?
In answering these questions, the Court retraced its steps
to the basic position that paragraphs one and two of Article 85
confer rights which can be enforced in the national courts. 16 8
The Court pointed out that while it may be appropriate for
national courts to suspend proceedings so long as the Com-
mission has not decided on an application for exemption, this
E.CR. 77, 86-87, 74 9-13, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) $ 8170, at 8270; see De Bloos v.
Bouyer, Case 59/77, 1977 E.C.R. 2359, 2369, 8, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8444, at 8031.
164. A comfort letter is a written declaration, usually signed by a director or
other high level official within the Directorate-General for Competition for the Com-
mission, that states a particular agreement presents no problem in terms of the com-
petition rules. See C.S. KERSE, supra note 7, at 193, § 6.54.
165. The Perfume cases are: L'Oreal v. De Nieuwe AMCK, Case 31/80, 1980
E.C.R. 3775, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8715; Lanc6me v. Etos, Case 99/79, 1980
E.C.R. 2511, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8714; Marty v. Lauder, Case 37/79, 1980
E.C.R. 2481, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8713; Procureur de la R~publique v. Giry
and Guerlain, Joined Cases 253/78 & 1-3/79, 1980 E.C.R. 2327, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8712.
166. See L'Oreal v. De Nieuwe AMCK, 1980 E.C.R. at 3789, 10, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8715, at 8606; Lanc6me v. Etos, 1980 E.C.R. at 2533, 10, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8714, at 8592; Marty v. Lauder, 1980 E.C.R. at 2499, 9, Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8713, at 8572; Procureur de la R~publique v. Giry and Guer-
lain, 1980 E.C.R. 2374, 12, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8712, at 8543.
167. This question arose only in the Lancdme case. 1980 E.C.R. at 2532, 6,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8714, at 8591.
168. L'Oreal v. De Nieuwe AMCK, 1980 E.C.R. at 3792, 20, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8715, at 8607-8608; Lancdme, 1980 E.C.R. at 2537, 25, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8714, at 8594; Marty v. Lauder, 1980 E.C.R. at 2501, 14 13-16, Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8713, at 8572-8573; Procureur de la R~publique v. Giry and
Guerlain, 1980 E.C.R. at 2375, 18, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8712, at 8543.
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can hardly be so when the Commission has issued a letter stat-
ing that it proposes to close the file. Consequently, the issuing
of a comfort letter has the effect of fully restoring the jurisdic-
tion of the national courts to decide whether an agreement in-
fringes Article 85(1) and is therefore unenforceable under Ar-
ticle 85(2). In deciding this question, the comfort letter is not
binding on the national courts but merely constitutes an ele-
ment of fact that the national courts may take into account in
reaching their decision. 169
The problem of automatic nullity came full circle in Minis-
tere Public v. Asjes ("Nouvelles Frontires"),'70 a case concerning
air transport tariffs. In De Geus v. Bosch the notion of provi-
sional validity was invoked to avoid the automatic nullity of
"old" agreements.' 7 ' In Nouvelles Fronti'res, the question arose
in relation to agreements to which Regulation 17 did not apply
at all. Council Regulation 141/62172 exempted transport from
the application of Regulation 17. The Council subsequently
adopted rules for transport by rail, road, and inland water-
way,' 73 but air transport remained exempt. Nevertheless, Arti-
cle 88 of the EEC Treaty provides that, in the absence of Com-
munity legislation,
the authorities in Member States shall rule on the admissi-
bility of agreements, decisions and concerted practices and
on abuse of a dominant position in the common market in
accordance with the law of their country and with the provi-
sions of Article 85, in particular paragraph 3, and of Article86. 174
Under French law, air transport could only be provided by un-
dertakings approved by the Ministry of Civil Aviation and at
169. L'Or~al v. De Nieuwe AMCK, 1980 E.C.R. at 3789-90, 11, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8715, at 8607; Lanc6me v. Etos, 1980 E.C.R. at 2533, 11, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8714, at 8592; Marty v. Lauder, 1980 E.C.R. at 2499, 10, Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8713, at 8572; Procureur de la R6publique v. Giry and Guer-
lain, 1980 E.C.R. at 2374, 13, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8712, at 8543.
170. Joined Cases 209-213/84, 1986 E.C.R. 1425, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,287.
171. Case 13/61, 1962 E.C.R. 45, 52-53, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8003, at
7139.
172. Council Regulation No. 141/62, 5J.O. 2751/62 (1962).
173. Council Regulation No. 1017/68, 11 J.O. L 175/1 (1968), Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 2815.
174. EEC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 88.
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tariffs also approved by the Ministry. 175 The defendants in the
national proceedings were prosecuted under the Civil Aviation
Code for selling air tickets at prices below the approved tariffs.
The French Court asked the European Court whether the pro-
visions of the French Code were compatible with Community
law. 1 76 The underlying question was whether the various
agreements and concerted practices by which air tariffs were
fixed constituted a breach of Article 85. If so, were the tariffs
unenforceable, thus rendering the prosecutions illegal under
Community law? Needless to say, the case raised issues of con-
siderable political delicacy and interest.
In the event, the Court resolved the problem by restating
the solution in De Geus v. Bosch, 1 7 7 that it would be contrary to
the principle of legal certainty that agreements should be pro-
hibited and rendered automatically void before it can be ascer-
tained whether Article 85 applies to them. 78 In the present
case, since Regulation 17 did not apply to air transport, such a
decision could only be made by "the authorities in the Member
States" and they had, ex hypothesi, taken no such decision. 179
Consequently, national courts had to accept the provisional va-
lidity of the agreements.
The anticompetitive effect of this conclusion was mitigated
by the Court reiterating that Member States are bound by the
EEC Treaty not to adopt or to maintain in force any measure
which could deprive Articles 85 and 86 of their effectiveness.
This approach, which could itself be described as "constitu-
tional" because it concerns the obligations of Member States
under the Treaty, is particularly significant since it emphasizes
a point made earlier in this paper, that "the whole treaty is
really about competition." The "Rules on Competition" are
"Common Rules"'' 8 0 and are complementary to the "Four Free-
175. Nouvelles Frontires, 1986 E.C.R. at 1427, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,287, at 16,781 (Opinion of Advocate General Lenz).
176. Id. at 1428-29, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,287, at 16,782.
177. Case 13/61, 1962 E.C.R. 45, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8003.
178. Nouvelles Frontieres, 1986 E.C.R. at 1426-27, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,287, at 16,779.
179. See id. at 1469-70, $$ 65-67, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,287, at
16,779-16,780. The Commission had not made, as it could have done under Article
89, a finding that the tariff agreements infringed Article 85. Id. at 1468, 59, Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH) $ 14,287, at 16,779.
180. See EEC.Treaty, supra note 8, arts. 85-94.
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doms" (freedom of movement of goods, persons, services, and
capital) that constitute the "Foundations of the Commu-
nity." 1 81 Competition is, so to speak, the fifth wheel on the
chariot of free movement. In this sense, the very notion of
cross-frontier competition is of constitutional importance.
B. Legitimate Expectation
Closely related to the principle of legal certainty is that of
legitimate expectation: that is, a person is entitled to act (and
conduct his business) with the reasonable expectation that the
law, as currently applied, will continue to be applied in the
same way. This principle was invoked in a case where fines
were imposed on a number of Belgian companies and trade
associations with respect to an agreement about conformity
checks for imported washing-machines and dishwashers. 8 2
The effect of the agreement was to make it impossible for im-
porters other than sole importers, to obtain conformity checks,
so excluding parallel imports.
The agreement had not been notified because the parties
took the (rather implausible) view that it fell within article 4(2)
of Regulation 17, which exempts agreements where "the only
parties thereto are undertakings from one Member State and
the agreements do not relate either to imports or to exports
between Member States." 83
The Commission rejected this contention and refused to
grant exemption under Article 85(3) on the ground that the
agreement had not been notified.' 84 The Court supported the
Commission on this point. However, it then had to address
the applicant's further contention that the parties to the agree-
ment ought not to have been fined because the Commission
had given the impression that no fines could be imposed with
respect to agreements exempt from the requirement of notifi-
cation. 8 5 It is not altogether clear from the report how the
181. Id. arts. 9-37.
182. IAZ v. Commission, Joined Cases 96-102, 104-05, 108 & 110/82, 1983
E.C.R. 3369, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,023.
183. Regulation 17, supra note 62, art. 4(2), 5J.O. at 206/62, O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed.
1959-62, at 88, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2431, at 1737.
184. IAZ, 1983 E.C.R. at 3412, 31, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,023, at
14,364.
185. Id. at 3413, 33, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,023, at 14,375.
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Commission could be said to have given such an impression.
However, the Court rejected the contention on the simpler
ground that the agreement was not exempt from notifica-
tion. 186
That case appears to be the only competition case in which
the principle of legitimate expectation, as such, was invoked as
a ground for annulling a Commission decision. But like many
such principles it overlaps with others such as the principle of
estoppel (scottici personal bar) formulated by Advocate General
Warner who observed:
[T]here emerges a general principle (applicable to a public
authority except where that would be irreconcilable with its
public duty) that one who, having legal relations with an-
other, by his conduct misleads that other as to a material
fact (including the existence of a right) cannot thereafter
base on that fact a claim against him if he (that other) has
acted in a relevant way in reliance on what he was lead by
that conduct to believe.' 8
7
An argument along these lines might be available if, for
example, the Commission reopened the file after issuing a
comfort letter without having any fresh facts before it.
C. Proportionality
The principle of proportionality is perhaps applied more
frequently by the Court than any other principle, but not very
often in competition cases. The principle is that the means
employed must be proportionate to the ends to be achieved. It
is an essential aspect of the German insistence that administra-
tive action must not be excessive or arbitrary. This principle
was invoked in National Panasonic v. Commission 188 but can be
best illustrated by the Court's approach in assessing the level
of fines in both Pioneer M and Hasselblad v. Commission.' 9°
According to the Commission, Pioneer was a crucial test
case for the competition policy of the Community, the real is-
186. Id. at 3413, 34, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,023, at 14,375.
187. Boizard v. Commission, Joined Cases 63 & 64/79, 1980 E.C.R. 2975, 3002.
188. Case 136/79, 1980 E.C.R. 2033, Common Mkt. Rep (CCH) 1 8682; see
supra notes 68-79 and accompanying text.
189. Musique Diffusion Fran~aise v. Commission ("Pioneer"), Joined Cases
100-03/80, 1983 E.C.R. 1825, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8880.
190. Case 86/82, 1984 E.C.R. 883, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,014.
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sue being the amount of the fines imposed.' 9 ' Under article
15(2) of Regulation 17, the Commission may by decision im-
pose on undertakings "fines of from 1,000 to 1,000,000 units
of account or a sum in excess thereof but not exceeding 10%
of the turnover in the preceding business year of each of the
undertakings participating in the infringement."'' 92
Until the late 1970s, the Commission had never imposed a
fine greater than 2% of turnover' 93 and the existence of what
was almost a tariff for competition infringements led some bus-
inessmen to make a cold assessment of whether it was finan-
cially worthwhile to break the law. The Commission decided
on a "get tough" policy. The first to feel its impact were Pio-
neer's European subsidiary and its French, German, and Brit-
ish distributors which had got together to prevent parallel im-
ports from Germany and Britain into France. Fines amounting
to 3% to 4% of turnover were imposed and were vigorously
contested before the Court.'9 4
It was argued by the applicants that the imposition of fines
at an unprecedentedly high level, without advance warning,
was retroactive, arbitrary, and disproportionate. 95 Pioneer
also argued that fines based on turnover should be based on
the corporation's turnover in the relevant market rather than
on total turnover. The fine imposed on the German distribu-
tor amounted to 18% of its turnover in the relevant market (hi-
fi equipment) which had never been more than 10% of its total
turnover.
Both the Court and the Advocate General held that the
words and the intention of article 15(2) were clear. The Court,
in its opinion, stated that "the [percentage] limit seeks to pre-
vent fines from being disproportionate in relation to the size of
the undertaking and, since only the total turnover can effec-
tively give an approximate indication of that size, the afore-
mentioned percentage must ... be understood as referring to
191. Pioneer, 1983 E.C.R. at 1946, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8880, at 8419
(Opinion of Advocate General Slynn).
192. Regulation 17, supra note 62, art. 15(2), 5J.O. at 209/62, Oj. Eng. Spec.
Ed. 1959-62, at 91-92, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2541, at 1771.
193. Pioneer, 1983 E.C.R. at 1905, 103-04, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8880,
at 8396.
194. Id. at 1946, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8880, at 8419.
195. Id.
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the total turnover."'' 96 The Advocate General thought that
"when increasing the fines some regard should be had to the
level of fines imposed in the past. ' 97
But the Court stated that "the proper application of the
Community competition rules requires that the Commission
may at any time adjust the level of fines to the needs of that
policy."' 9 8 However, the Court also held that the fine imposed
in a given case must not be arbitrary or disproportionate.' 99
In the event, the fines were reduced substantially, in part
because the Court held that the Commission had been wrong
in relation to the duration of the infringement. 200 In the case
of the German distributor, which had complained that the
mere imposition of the fine had endangered its credit position
and that payment would endanger its very existence being
equivalent to several years' profits, the Court was even more
lenient than the Advocate General had suggested. 20 t But the
Court pointed out that if, as the German distributor said, sales
of hi-fi equipment only represented 10% of its turnover, it
ought more easily to have resisted the pressure to take part in
illegal activity. 20 2
In Hasselblad, the result was very much the same in that the
fine was halved on the ground that "the applicant is not a large
196. Id. at 1908, 119, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8880, at 8397.
197. Id. at 1947, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8880, at 8420 (Opinion of Advo-
cate General Slynn).
198. Id. at 1906, 109, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8880, at 8396.
199. Id. at 1909, 121, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8880, at 8396-8397. The
Court stated that
on the one hand, it is permissible, for the purpose of fixing the fine, to have
regard both to the total turnover of the undertaking, which gives an indica-
tion, albeit approximate and imperfect, of the size of the undertaking and of
its economic power, and to the proportion of that turnover accounted for by
the goods in respect of which the infringement was committed, which gives
an indication of the scale of the infringement. On the other hand, it follows
that it is important not to confer on one or the other of those figures an
importance disproportionate in relation to the other factors and, conse-
quently, that the fixing of an appropriate fine cannot be the result of a sim-
ple calculation based on the total turnover.
Id.
200. Id. at 1909-10, 4 123-24, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8880, at 8398.
201. Compare id. at 1909-10, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8880, at 8399 (Judg-
ment) with id. at 1953, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8880, at 8424 (Opinion of Advo-
cate General Slynn).
202. Id. at 1912, 134, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8880, at 8399.
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undertaking. 20 3 But the Court reiterated that "[a]n undertak-
ing's turnover is only one of the factors which may be taken
into account ' 20 4 and described Hasselblad's refusal to supply
as "a flagrant breach of the rules on competition contained in
the Treaty. ' 20
5
CONCLUSION
If "rights of defense" are included in the same family as
the general principles of law discussed in the last section, their
day-to-day application is probably of greater importance in the
development of Community competition law than more
grandly stated issues of fundamental rights. Indeed, the
number of competition cases in which the Court has sustained
an argument based on fundamental rights is very small indeed.
But Hoechst shows that it is not too late to bring out the big
guns of constitutional artillery. It is perhaps ironical that it
should be just at this moment that the front line battleground
has been moved to the Court of First Instance.
203. Hasselblad v. Commission, Case 86/82, 1984 E.C.R. 883, 911, 57, Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,014, at 14,189.
204. Id. at 911, 57, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,014, at 14,189.
205. Id.
